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ARTICLE

SEEING SUBTLE RACISM
Pat K. Chewt
they ask me to remember
but they want me to remember
their memories
and I keep on remembering
mine
Traditional employment discrimination law does not offer remedies for
subtle bias in the workplace. For instance, in empirical studies of racial
harassment cases, plaintifs are much more likely to be successful if they claim
egregious and blatant racistincidents rather than more subtle examples of racial
intimidation, humiliation, or exclusion. But some groundbreaking jurists are
cognizant of the reality and harm ofsubtle bias-andare acknowledgingthem in
their analysis in racial harassment cases. While not yet widely recognized, the
jurists are nonetheless creating important precedentsfor a re-interpretationof
racial harassmentjurisprudence, and by extension, employment discrimination
jurisprudence more broadly. This article traces the development of racial
harassmentjurisprudence, explaining the development of the traditionalmodel,
which does not recognize subtle bias. It concludes with an analysis of an
alternativejurisprudentialmodel that "sees" subtle racism.
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INTRODUCTION

Racial harassment in the workplace is unfortunately alive and well across
many employment settings and professions.2 In 2007 alone, there were about
7000 claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).3
The story of racial harassment jurisprudence began much earlier in 1969,
with Mrs. Josephine Chavez in Rogers v. EEOC.4 Like so many of these
stories, it started with a minority employee who perceived disturbing and
significant racial hostility in his or her workplace. Mrs. Chavez, a Hispanic
employee, filed charges against her employer, "Texas State Optical," owned by
brothers S. J. and N. Jay Rogers in Beaumont, Texas.5 Mrs. Chavez argued that
her employer's business practice of segregating patients by their race created an
"'atmosphere that would adversely affect the terms and conditions of her
employment' and thus have an effect that is proscribed by Title VIl." 6
Fifth Circuit Court Judge Goldberg accepted the EEOC's and Mrs.
Chavez's then novel theory: "I think that the relationship between an employee
and his [or her] working environment is of such significance as to be entitled to
statutory protection." 7 Writing the majority opinion, he noted that Congress
2. For instance, an empirical study of racial harassment cases found that racial
harassment cases occurred among private and government sectors, and across many types of
enterprises (including manufacturers, health care, social services, and professional services).
Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 70-71 (2006).
3. Telephone Interview with Stephanie Aiken Murphy, Program Analyst, EEOC (Mar.
7, 2008); see also Stephanie Armour, Racial Harassment Lawsuits at Work Go Up, USA
TODAY, Oct. 26, 2007, at lB. For general statistics on all race-based complaints and all
harassment-related complaints, see EEOC, Enforcement & Litigation Statistics,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
4. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
5. Id. at 236.

6. Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 424 (E.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd, 454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
7. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 237-38.
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intended Title VII to be liberally and flexibly interpreted to achieve its antidiscriminatory purposes:
I regard this broad-gauged innovation [sic] legislation as a charter of
principles which are to be elucidated and explicated by experience, time, and
expertise. Therefore, it is my belief that employees' psychological as well as
economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse,
and that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in
Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creatinp a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination.
Although never using the terms "harassment" or "hostile environment," as
these claims were later labeled by other courts, 9 Judge Goldberg nonetheless
began to delineate the scope of racial harassment jurisprudence: "One can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination
as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the
eradication of such noxious practices."1o
Since the Rogers case, hundreds of judicial opinions on racial harassment
have been written." An empirical review of judicial opinions in the federal
courts reveals that most opinions are a district court's disposition of an
employer defendant's motion for summary judgment, providing us the
opportunity to squarely study judicial decision making.12 The cases also present
an interesting racial triad: most commonly, the plaintiff is African American;
the alleged harasser is White; and the judge presiding over the dispute is
White.13 Furthermore, each of these participants in the court proceeding is
8. Id. at 238. Rogers argued that Chavez's charge alleged discrimination against the
employers' patients but not toward any employees and that, therefore, Chavez could not
personally claim discriminatory treatment. Judge Goldberg rejected Rogers's argument.
Noting support from the then recent Supreme Court case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), Judge Goldberg explained that Title VII is also aimed at "consequences

[and] effects of an employment practice" even in the absence of evidence of discriminatory
motivation. Id. at 238-39.
9. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
10. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
I1. Chew & Kelley, supra note 2, at 63 (estimating 735 judicial opinions between
1980-1999).
12. Chew & Kelley, supra note 2, at 78 tbl.10 (indicating that 79.1% of all district
court cases and 73.6% of appellate court cases in a study of racial harassment cases dealt

with motions for summary judgment).
13. The plaintiffs' race in racial harassment cases is overwhelmingly African
American. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth-of the Color-BlindJudge: An Empirical
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1117, 1143 tbl.3 (2009)

[hereinafter Chew & Kelley 20091 (indicating that 80.9% of plaintiffs (300 of 371) are
African American in a study of racial harassment cases between 1980-2003). Based on the
authors' review of hundreds of judicial opinions, judicial opinions do not routinely identify
the alleged harassers' race, but when they do, the harassers tend to be White. The judges in
racial harassment cases also are predominantly White. Id. at 1143 (finding that 88% of
judges (350 of 398) in a study of racial harassment cases were White).
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asked to determine whether racism, particularly racial harassment, has
occurred.' 4 Contrary to the conjecture that employment discrimination cases
favor the plaintiffs, it turns out that employers are successful approximately
80% of the time in their motions for summary judgment in these disputes, thus
precluding plaintiffs from moving forward with their cases.
As Part I of this Article describes, two decades after Rogers, the Supreme
Court articulated general legal principles for the harassment doctrine. 16
However, it offered only minimal guidance on how to interpret key, yet
amorphous, terms. Left to their discretion, most federal courts relied on a
jurisprudence that interprets racial harassment narrowly and mechanically.
This traditional approach looks almost exclusively for explicit and blatant
racism that is unambiguously directed at the plaintiffs because of their racewhat social scientists call "old-fashioned racism."' 8
Yet, as Part II explains, racial harassment can also be subtle and implicit,
akin to what social scientists call "modem racism."19 Racism is not always
ostentatiously egregious, explicit, or even conscious. Indeed, in contemporary
American society, it is often more subtle and understood only when studied
within the context in which it occurs. Ongoing empirical research helps to
explain modem racism, including the ways in which social and organizational
norms affect its occurrence.
Distinct from the traditional jurists described above, some judges are
crafting an alternative model for racial harassment jurisprudence that
acknowledges both old-fashioned racism and modern racism. 20 While
characteristics of this alternative jurisprudential model were present in the
Rogers case,21 after the Supreme Court cases, this alternative model was
seldom cited. Some groundbreaking jurists, however, are adopting this model
22
and "seeing" the subtle racism against minority employees.
Which jurisprudential model becomes the norm is critical to the thousands
of complaining employees and defending employers. While the traditional
model envisions the prohibitions of Title VII much more narrowly and
mechanically, the alternative model opens the door to a more reality-based
14. In pleading their cases, plaintiff employees argue that they were racially harassed
and that they perceived their workplace as racially hostile; defendant employers defend
against liability by arguing that plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof and that in their
motion for summary judgment, that there are not material issues of law or fact; the judge
hearing the motion for summary judgment must assess the parties' claims. See discussion
infra Part I.A. further describing the applicable legal principles.
15. Chew & Kelley 2009, supra note 13, at 1143 tbl.3.
16. See discussion infra Part I.A.
17. See discussion infra Part I.B.
18. See discussion infra Part I.B.
19. See discussion infra Part II.A.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 4-10, infra note 160.
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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interpretation of employment discrimination law.23 Thus, while this article
concentrates on racial harassment cases, there are implications for employment
discrimination claims more generally.
I. TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND OLD-FASHIONED RACISM

A. Supreme Court Offers Little Guidance
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states:
[It is] an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race ... 24
As the brief analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence below indicates,
in a trio of landmark cases, the Court identified key principles for evaluating
employees' claims for discriminatory harassment under Title VII. While the
Supreme Court cases of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, Harris v. Forklift
Systems, and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services25 dealt with sexual
harassment claims, the Court and subsequent courts presumed that the same
legal principles apply to racial harassment claims and other forms of
26
harassment. Thus, racial harassment cases routinely cited Meritor, Harris,
and Oncale with approval.27 However, while the Supreme Court stated the
elements of a plaintiff s basic claim, the Court did not provide clear guidelines
on how key terms of each element are to be determined.28
23. See discussion infra Part II.A.
24.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).

25. Meritor Say. Bank v Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510
U.S. 17 (1993); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).

26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. The author has questioned in another article, however,
whether the universal practice of applying the legal principles devised in sexual harassment
cases to racial harassment cases is appropriate. Pat K. Chew, Freeing Racial Harassment
from the Sexual HarassmentModel, 85 OR. L. REv. 615 (2006).
27. See discussion infra Part I.B and Part II.B.
28. As interpreted by the courts, a racial harassment claim is essentially a hybrid
employment discrimination claim. While it is generally linked to intentional discrimination,
the Supreme Court and other courts, such as Rogers v. EEOC, cited supra in text
accompanying notes 4-10, 158, focus on the impact of the harassment on the plaintiff, rather
than on the intentions or motives of the harasser. Their prime inquiry is whether the
harassment had the deleterious effect on the plaintiff that was prohibited by law: a racially
hostile work environment. See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-905 (11th
Cir. 1982) (articulating the elements in a sexual harassment claim: (1) that the employee
belong to a protected class; (2) that the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment affected a
term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) that the doctrine of respondeatsuperior
applies).
While the trio of cases discussed here identify the essential elements of the plaintiff's
racial harassment claim, the twin cases of Burlington Industries,Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
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1. Meritor recognized harassment (hostile environment) doctrine.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, Mechelle Vinson, an assistant bank

branch manager, accused her male supervisor, Sidney Taylor, of making
numerous sexual demands on her over a four-year period.29 In fear of losing her
job, she complied with these demands. 30 Before Meritor, employers could not
make discriminatory employment decisions (e.g., regarding hiring, firing,
promotion) that harmed the employee economically, but it was less clear
whether Title VII would extend to hostile working environments where specific
employment decisions may not have been made and economic harm was not
obvious.31 The express terms of the statute, shown above,32 do not include
harassment.
Justice Rehnquist confirmed in Meritor that the phrase "'terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." 33
Agreeing with EEOC guidelines and precedent supporting the inclusion of
harassment under Title VII's umbrella, the Court explained, "Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult."3 4 Citing the Rogers case with approval
35
(although inexplicably misquoting the facts), the Court recognized that a
doctrine of discriminatory harassment had been correctly applied in lower
(1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) explain the employer's
possible affirmative defense. They conclude that employers will be vicariously liable for
their supervisors' unlawful harassment of employees if such harassment results in "tangible
employment action" such as an employee's denial of promotion, firing, or other significant
change in employment status. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08. However, if the harassment
does not culminate in tangible employment action, employers have an affirmative defense if
they made reasonable efforts to prevent and address the harassment and if the plaintiff
employee unreasonably fails to take advantage of the employers' efforts. The
Faragher/Ellerthcases provide the standard for supervisor harassment, but the "knew or
should have known and failed to take prompt corrective action" standard still applies to
coworker harassment. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
29. Meritor,477 U.S. at 59-60.
30. Id. at 60-61.
31. Id at 64-65.
32. See text accompanying note 24.
33. Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.
34. Id. at 65.
35. Id. at 65-66. Justice Rehnquist erroneously described the facts as a Hispanic
complainant charging that her employer created an offensive work environment for
employees by giving discriminatory service to its "Hispanic" clientele. The correct facts, as
described above, involved a Hispanic employee plaintiff and the optometrists' African
American clientele. It is unclear how to explain this inadvertent but interesting factual error.
Was it merely an error in transcription or, in the alternative, was it a "Freudian slip" because
the Court found it too unconventional or dissonant that one minority group might be
personally distressed over the treatment of another minority group? See also Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognized as the first case to endorse the hostile
work environment theory of sexual harassment).
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federal courts to racial, religious, and national origin forms of harassment, and
should likewise be applied to sexual harassment.36 Following the vernacular of
lower federal courts, the Court also labeled discriminatory harassment that did
not expressly include a quid pro quo as "hostile environment." 37
2. Harrisconsidered "all the circumstances" in determining whether the
harassment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to alter the work
environment.
While the plaintiff in Meritor claimed physical sexual harassment, the
plaintiffs claim in Harris v. Forklift Systems, was of a different nature.38
Teresa Harris, a manager at an equipment rental company, accused company
president Charles Hardy of repeated offensive comments, often of a sexual
nature, over a two and a half year period.39 While the Supreme Court expressly
addressed whether the plaintiff had to prove serious injury to her psychological
wellbeing as part of her hostile environment claim, they used the case to
consider more broadly "the definition" of an actionable harassment claim.
The Court had the opportunity to provide clear and specific guidelines on
the harassment claim, but instead it responded more ambiguously. Writing for
the majority, Justice O'Connor took a "middle path between making actionable
any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the [harasser's] conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury." 40 Conceding that determining the
viability of a plaintiffs claim cannot be a "mathematically precise test" and
that the Court "need not answer today all the potential questions it raises,"
Justice O'Connor held that the viability of a plaintiffs claim should be
determined by "looking at all the circumstances."4 1 She listed five types of
factors (frequency of harassment, severity of harassment, physicality of
harassment, interference with the employee's work performance, psychological
impact) to consider, but she cautioned that no particular factor is required and
that the list was not intended to be comprehensive. 42
The Court also held that the "severe or pervasive" requirement must satisfy
both an objective and a subjective standard:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile

36. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
37. Id. at 65. The Court cautioned that not all harassment was actionable: "it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment."' Id. at 67 (quoting from Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
The Court also added that the plaintiff must by her or his conduct demonstrate that the
"alleged sexual advances were unwelcome." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
38. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993).
39. Id. at 19.
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. at22-23.
42. Id. at 23.

190

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[VI:2

or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title Vll's purview. Likewise, if the
victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the
conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment,
and there is no Title VIl violation. 43
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, acknowledged that the majority
opinion's explanation of the legal standards for a hostile environment claim
was unclear:
[The majority's guidelines] do[] not seem to me to be a very clear standardand I do not think that clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb
"objectively" or by appealing to a "reasonable person['s]" notion of what the
vague word means. . . As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually
unguided juries [to] decide [these cases]. 44
3. Oncale confirmed an attributional element: the harasser's conduct must
be because of the plaintiff's protected status (e.g., sex, race, national
origin).
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,45 Joseph Oncale worked as a
roustabout on an eight-person crew that worked on an oil platform in the Gulf
of Mexico. 46 He accused his all-male coworkers of forcibly subjecting him to
repeated sex-related, humiliating actions including physically assaulting him in
a sexual manner. The lower courts concluded that same-sex harassment was not
actionable under Title VII, but the Supreme Court held that it was actionable.47
The Court also used the case to further explore the harassment doctrine's
attributional element: that the harasser's actions must be "because of' the
plaintiffs protected status.
As Justice Scalia discussed, the legislators did not originally have male-onmale harassment in mind, but it was appropriate to "go beyond the principal
evil to cover reasonably comparably evils," given the statute's provisions and
intent.4 "The critical issue, Title V1's text indicates, is whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed."4 9 While this attributional
element in a sexual harassment claim may be satisfied by the inference of a
harasser's sexual desire, it may also be evidenced by other motivations, such as
the harasser's general hostility to women (or to men) in the workplace.50
The Court reaffirmed that the harassment needed to be severe or pervasive
Id at 21-22.
Id. at 24.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
46. Id. at 77.
47. Id. at 78.
48. Id. at 79.
49. Id. at 80 (citing Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris,510 U.S. at 25).
50. Id. at 80.
43.
44.
45.
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enough so that when objectively assessed it would alter the conditions of the
plaintiff s employment. 5 ' The Court added that this assessment should carefully
consider the social context in which the conduct occurs. This context depends
on "a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words
used or the physical acts performed."52 Given Justice Scalia's criticism of
Justice O'Connor's unclear legal guidance in Harris, one wonders if Justice
Scalia did any better with his articulation of the harassment doctrine in Oncale.
B. Judges Adopt Paradigm of "Old-Fashioned Racism"
Lower federal courts soon began applying the general legal principles
announced by the Supreme Court in Merritor, Harris, and Oncale to racial
harassment and other discriminatory harassment cases:53 namely that Title VII
protected employees against discriminatory harassment and a hostile
environment; that the harassment needed to be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to actually alter the work environment; and that harassers' conduct must be
because of plaintiffs' protected status (e.g., race, sex, national origin).
Furthermore, beginning around 1977, there was a surge of racial harassment
cases, 54 providing numerous opportunities for judges to consider plaintiffs'
claims and defendants' motions to dismiss them. 55 Given the lack of clear
guidance by the Supreme Court, judges were left to devise various interpretive
schemes. Many adhered to a traditional jurisprudential model, described below.
An alternative jurisprudential model is explained in Part II of the Article.56
Facing the daunting task of determining whether plaintiffs have described a
racially hostile environment, many courts look for some straightforward model.
A review of hundreds of randomly sampled racial harassment cases reveals that
many judges have in mind a classic racial harassment paradigm:57 White
supervisors and coworkers continuously bombarding and humiliating African
American employees directly with racial epithets and sometimes blatantly
racist objects. Faced with this harassment, African American employees fall
apart emotionally and physically, thus unable to carry out their basic job
responsibilities. Significantly, to the extent that the plaintiffs claim do not
match this paradigm, it appears difficult for these first-wave judges to believe

Id. at 81.
52. Id. at 81-82.
53. See discussion supraPart I.A.
54. Chew & Kelley, supra note 2, at 96-98 and 98 fig. 4 (noting increase in cases
beginning in 1997-2002 period).
55. While plaintiffs must show they satisfy all the elements of the racial harassment
claim, employers may also assert affirmative defenses. See supra note 28.
56. See discussion infra Part II.B.
57. See generally Chew & Kelley, supra note 2 (describing their extensive study of
cases over a twenty-year period).
51.
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that illegal racial harassment has occurred.
Constrained by this paradigm, these judges narrowly limit what they
consider relevant evidence. In particular, they rely on "old-fashioned" blatant
manifestations of racial harassment, such as supervisors' or co-workers' use of
"nigger" and other patently racist language, or the display of patently racist
objects, such as nooses and Ku Klux Klan attire.59 In Walker v. Thompson, 60
for instance, the court focused specifically on the persistent barrage of patently
racist remarks toward African American employees to prevent a motion for
summary judgment: "While working for Glassfloss [the employer], the
appellants at various times were subjected to: comparisons to slaves and
monkeys, derisive remarks regarding their African heritage, and conversations
in which a co-worker and supervisor used the word 'nigger."'61 Similarly, in
Frazier v. Smith,62 the court emphasized specifically the repeated barrage of
racial slurs used to refer to an African American jail administrator in a county
sheriff's department and to black inmates when concluding that the plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence of racial harassment. 63 Some judges count up
these examples of explicit racism to reach some unidentified minimum number
that signals "pervasive" harassment. Judges' focus on explicit racism in racial
harassment cases is also supported by empirical research that plaintiffs are
much more likely to be successful when claiming they were harassed by racial
slurs and racist objects. 65
While considering explicit racism only, this traditional jurisprudential
approach consequently discounts or simply ignores more subtle harassment
incidents that the plaintiffs claim are race-linked. For example, in James-Gray
v. Hanes Hosiery,66 Sheila James-Gray, a secretary in the public relations

58. For example, Mingo v. Urban League, No. 589-37, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15458
(N.D. Ind. 1994), did not fit the paradigm in a number of ways, and the plaintiff was unable
to get the court to think about her case more creatively. The court found implausible that
Gwendolyn Elizabeth Mingo, an African American woman, could be racially harassed by
her African American boss in a racially diverse work environment in a civil rights
organization. The court further noted that her allegations of a racially hostile environment
were not credible given that some of the racist remarks were spoken more generally rather
than targeting only her and that she lacked physical signs of stress.
59. See discussion infra Part I.B.
60. Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 2000).
61. Id. at 626.
62. Frazier v. Smith, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
63. Id at 1369-1370.
64. See, e.g., Tillmon v. Garnett Corp., No. 97C 8212, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11972 at
*9-10 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (indicating that "eight racial comments in 25 months, which averages
to one every three months" was insufficient).
65. Chew & Kelley 2009, supra note 13, at 1143 tbl. 3 (indicating that plaintiffs who
claimed racial slurs were successful 30% of the time, but were successful only 11.1% of the
time when they did not claim racial slurs).
66. James-Gray v. Hanes Hosiery, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13016, at *28-33 (S.D.
N.Y. 1998).

Oct. 20 10]

SUBTLE RACISM

193

department, referred to a number of incidents, including her supervisors' rolling
their eyes when they saw her and avoiding direct communication with her, and
her receiving a birthday card with Buckwheat (the black child in the Little
Rascals). 7 The court, looking specifically for "overtly racial" incidents, found
none, concluding that the only incident "remotely related to race" was the
birthday card.68
Furthermore, a frequent tendency of traditional jurisprudence is to impose
particular requirements before racist incidents are considered relevant to a
racial harassment claim-a kind of "racism-plus" standard. In other words,
even with these racial "smoking guns," 69 plaintiffs are required to show more.
As the following cases illustrate, traditionalist judges characteristically require
all or some of the following: (1) the racist incidents, such as racial slurs, be
directed at the plaintiffs and in their presence,70 (2) the racist incidents be
accompanied by some physical threat or assault,71 (3) the plaintiffs display
particular signs of harm, 72 and (4) there is no other possible race-neutral
explanation for the harassment. 73 Jurists who defer to this last requirement
seem ready to explain away the plaintiffs complaints of racism by
characterizing racist incidents as isolated or harmless, giving harassers the
benefit of the doubt, or describing the complaining minority employee as
overly sensitive or otherwise at fault. 74
To illustrate this racism-plus standard, consider the district court opinion in
Schwapp v. Town of Avon. 7 5 Alvin Schwapp was the only African American

67. Id. at *2-19.
68. Id. at *28-33.
69. As described in Aman v. Cort FurnitureRental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3rd Cir.
1996).
70. See, e.g., Jones v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (court discounts evidence to which plaintiff was not "privy").
71. See, e.g., Findlay v. Reynolds Metals Co., 82 F. Supp. 2d 27, 39 (N.D. N.Y. 2000)
(indicating that plaintiff did not show that incidents were physically threatening); Walker v.
Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000); Frazier v. Smith, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
72. See, e.g., Jones v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (court questions plaintiffs complaint since she "admits" that she "enjoyed working.");
Mitchell v. Carrier Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1568, 1577-78 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (court would not
consider racist graffiti in workplace because perpetrator was unknown, epithets because they
were not spoken, and evidence that was not in plaintiffs office).
73. See, e.g., Padilla v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 67 F. Supp. 2d 650, 661 (E.D. Tex.
1999) (attributing harassing actions to harasser's personal animosity toward plaintiff); White
v. Money Store, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10143 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (plaintiffs allegations
explained by employer's business purposes and policies); Ballard v. Alabama, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1822 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (plaintiffis overly sensitive).
74. For example, consider the district court opinion in Schwapp v. Town of Avon, No.
3:94CV01532(AVC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17768 (Conn. Sept. 20, 1996), rev'd, 118 F.3d
106 (2d Cir. 1997), infra discussion notes 75-81.
75. Schwapp LEXIS 17768 (Conn. 1996). The district court opinion and the appellate
court opinion in the Schwapp case provide an instructive contrast of the two jurisprudential
approaches. The judge in the district court opinion, as described above, used a first-wave
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police officer at the Avon Police Department for the two years he worked there.
76
He based his racial harassment claim on a dozen incidents. Four central
incidents occurred in Schwapp's presence, including other police officers'
racist slurs about a woman that was being patrolled, a casual racist insult about
a black football player, and a racist joke. When Schwapp complained to a high
ranking officer in the department about these incidents, the officer advised
Schwapp that he "should not expect his fellow workers to exhibit the same
courtesy" as Schwapp did to them, and should not be "so sensitive." 77 He
explained that Schwapp "had to understand the history of an all white male
department and that at one time all the crimes in Avon were committed by
blacks and that guys started to stereotype people."7 8
Another group of incidents involved racist comments that Schwapp did not
experience first-hand but were communicated to him by other police officers.79
They included a supervising officer starting a roll call with "watch out for the
nigger at 48" referring to an African American man who worked at a gas
station, and the same officer instructing other officers to target African
Americans and Hispanics for traffic stops along a certain route. When one
officer protested a racist joke told during roll call, a supervising officer
responded that Schwapp "was not present to be offended." 80 There were also
other racially derogatory jokes that were apparently part of the regular
workplace banter. While many of the racist comments were aimed at African
Americans, others were directed at Latinos/as, Puerto Ricans, and persons of
Middle-Eastem origin.8 1 A number of the comments were made by two
particular officers, but there was widespread participation by other officers and
supervisors.82
Judge Covello's mechanical approach to these allegations began with his
(and the employer's) requirement that the racial harassment be "pervasive" and
"continuous," 83 even though the Supreme Court does not require that the
harassment be continuous in hostile environment cases. 84 He then defined these
terms rigidly, literally quoting from the dictionary that "continuous" is defined
as "stretching on without break or interruption; recurring regularly." 85 Judge
approach, ultimately granting the employer's motion for summary judgment. The appellate
court, demonstrating the alternative jurisprudential model, denied the employer's motion
(see infra note 184).
76. Schwapp, LEXIS 17768, at *3-8; rev'd, 18 F.3d 106, 108-110 (2d Cir. 1997).
77. Schwapp, LEXIS 17768 at *6-7.
78. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir.1997).
79. Schwapp, LEXIS 17768, at *12-19.
80. Schwapp, 118 F.3d at 108.
81. Id. at 109.
82. See id. at 108-109.
83. Schwapp, LEXIS 17768, at *9, 21-22.
84. In Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993), for instance, the Supreme Court
specifies that the harassment be "severe or pervasive."
85. Schwapp, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17768, at *9-10 n.8. The court also quotes from
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Covello then excluded the affidavits of two former police officers describing
racist incidents in the department.86 By excluding these affidavits, the court
eliminated from consideration all the incidents in which Schwabb was not
personally present. It deemed this evidence not particular enough and
irrelevant. For instance, the court concluded that allegations of police officers
getting instructions for racial profiling of motorists was not related to the
plaintiff s claim of a racially hostile work environment.
When Judge Covello turned to the incidents where Schwapp was present,
he quoted from a number of other select cases, but did not discuss how he was
applying those precedents to this fact pattern. Without offering details, he held:
"After evaluating the totality of the circumstances" in the case, the facts as
alleged fail to establish a "pervasive and continuous" atmosphere of racial
discrimination. Therefore, the plaintiffs Title VII claim based upon a hostile
work environment in the district court failed.89
In Tillmon v. Garnett Corporation,90 Moses Tillmon was employed as a
laborer for two years by a general construction and remodeling contracting
company. Tillmon alleged eight specific incidents in support of his racial
harassment claim. As summarized by Judge Gettlemen:
In plaintiffs first month, Michael Miller [a coworker] allegedly referred to
another employee as a "250 buck nigger." Michael Miller also allegedly
referred to a stray dog as a "nigger dog." In April 1995 while plaintiff was in a

dump truck shoveling mulch, Jed Miller [another coworker] made a reference
to "picking cotton." In mid-1995 Dean Garnett [president and owner] wrote a
"2" on plaintiff s tool box, explaining that since plaintiff was not white, he had
a "2 box" rather than a "tool box." Also in 1995, Jed Miller allegedly offered
plaintiff a tie presented as a "noose," and once referred to plaintiff as his
"slave." In early 1996, Dean Garnett jokingly referred to the Million Man
March as a "pack of lips," an apparent play on the word "apocalypse." Garnett
also allegedly told plaintiff that Chris Miller, a hiring manager, would throw
out job applications of African-Americans, claiming he smelled alcohol or
something else. The final incident, which allegedly precipitated plaintiffs
voluntary resignation from his job at Garnett Corporation, was his discovery
of a small dime-sized swastika etched onto his tool box. Plaintiff claims that
he complained to Dean Garnett initially, and then to Robinson [an AfricanWebster's Third InternationalDictionary defining "'pervasive' as: 'that [which] pervades or
tends to pervade especially in such as way as to be or become prevalent or dominant."' Id. at
*10 n.8.
86.

Id. at *12-19.

87. Id. at *13-14 n.9. The court also noted that the texts of the two affidavits "are
nearly identical, leading the reader to question the bona fides of the affiants' statements." Id.
at *12. The court did not acknowledge an alternative equally plausible explanation that
nearly identical affidavits reinforce the veracity of both affiants. Id.

88. Id. at *21.
89. But see Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd,
Schwapp, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17768.
90. Tillmon v. Garnett Corp., No. 97 C 8212, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11972 (N.D. Ill.
July 27, 1999).
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American project manager], who told him that the company was filled [sic]
racists, including Dean Garnett, and that plaintiff would have to get used to
it.91

Despite this evidence, the court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable person would not find
Tillmon's work environment racially hostile or abusive. 92 It is the criteria that
the court attributes to a "reasonable person" that is so telling of the judge's own
rigidity in defining discriminatory harassment. As he explained below, he
assumed that a "reasonable person" requires physical attacks, direct threats, and
frequent racial comments before believing that a racially hostile work
atmosphere is plausible.
[Our] inescapable conclusion than even if [these allegations are] true,
defendants' conduct does not fall on the harassment side of the line. Plaintiff
was not physically attacked, nor was he directly threatened or intimidated.
Rather, the conduct consisted of isolated instances of offensive remarks. There
were only eight racial comments in 25 months, which averages to one every
three months, and some of those incidents were not directed at plaintiff. ...
[A]lthough defendants' alleged conduct was reprehensible and without place
in a civilized society, it simpl was not sufficiently severe or frequent to create
a hostile work environment.
The judge in Mitchell v. Carrier Corporation94 similarly follows this
racism-plus standard. Stacey Mitchell, a black production employee in a
refrigeration unit manufacturing company in Georgia, alleged the following in
support of his racial harassment claim:
Mitchell observed racial epithets written on the bathroom walls at the Carrier
plant, such as "Woody Wilson-Nigger Ape," "Nigger," and "Niggers go home
to Africa." Some of this racist graffiti remained on the bathroom walls for
months, despite complaints to management by Plaintiff and others. Mitchell
also noticed rebel flags and the initials "KKK" drawn on "travel packets,"
envelopes affixed to refrigeration units within the plant. He reported these
incidents to his supervisor, Woodrow Wilson. 95
He also was aware of a coworker's racist comments about him and believed
96
that his conflicts with coworkers were related to their racial animus.
While Judge Fitzpatrick in Mitchell conceded that the discriminatory
conduct was "unquestionably humiliating" and "offensive to the reasonable
person," he nonetheless concluded that the incidents, collectively, "simply
97
[were] not 'sufficiently severe or pervasive"' to create a hostile environment.
The "severity" of the harassment, the court explained, was diminished because

91.

Id. at *3-4.

92. Id. at *8.
93. Id. at *9-10.

94. Mitchell v. Carrier Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
95. Id. at 1573.

96. Id. at 1577.
97. Id.
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"those responsible for the graffiti were unknown[,] . .. the epithets were written
rather than spoken," and the coworker's racist statements about Mitchell were
not said directly to Mitchell.98 Despite Mitchell's claim that the constant and
pervasive reminders of racism interfered with his work performance, the court
questioned Mitchell's own subjective belief that he was being racially harassed
given his supervisors' positive evaluations of his work. 99 While individuals
experience the stress of discrimination and humiliation differently,' 0 0 the court
here appeared to require proof of a plaintiffs poor job attitude and
performance. 0 ' Given this court's rigid and mechanical approach, it is not
surprising that it concluded that the allegations were "not egregious enough." 02
Other courts in this first jurisprudential wave share the Mitchell court's
vantage point, proposing that the standard for illegal racial harassment is
extremely high. In Diggs v. Burlington Railway, 0 3 the court admitted that
Chris Diggs, a black railway worker, based his racial harassment claim on
incidents that were "not acceptable in modem society and obviously offensive
to Diggs," but were nonetheless legally insufficient.104 The Seventh Circuit in
several cases indicated that the workplace must be "hellish" before it is
actionable as hostile environment. 05 While the Supreme Court did not dictate
such a high standard for discriminatory harassment cases, 06 these courts
apparently choose to define a hostile work environment as one that is
insufferable.
Another stunning, almost ludicrous, example of this excessive standard is
provided by what can be called the "no noose" case. In Shorter v. Altair Gases

98. Id.

99. Id.
100. For examples, see generally Richard J. Contrada et al., Ethnicity-RelatedSources
of Stress and Their Effects on Well-Being, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSCYHOL. ScI. 136
(2000); Elizabeth A. Dietch et al., Subtle Yet Significant: The Existence and Impact of
Everyday Racial Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 HUM. REL. 1299 (2003); and Gilbert
C. Gee et al., A Nationwide Study of Discriminationand Chronic Health ConditionsAmong
Asian Americans, 7 AMER. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1275 (2007).
I01. Mitchell, 954 F. Supp. at 1577-78.
102. Id. at 1578.

103. Diggs v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 1:00CVI-D-D, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7689 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 23, 2001). Diggs' claims were based primarily on three
incidents: (1) coworkers placing an "Aunt Jemima" doll in his work area; (2) coworker using
"nigger" in Diggs' presence, although the coworker was subsequently suspended; and (3)
coworkers posting a notice on the employee bulletin board to raise money for the suspended
harasser, although the notice was removed after Diggs complained about it. Diggs also
alleged that when he complained to his supervisor that White employees referred to African
Americans as "niggers," the supervisor told him "to keep his mouth shut." Id. at *1-3.

104. Id. at *10- 11.
105. Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997); Baskerville v.
Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995); Manson v. General Motors Corp., No.
00 C 1713, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17215, at *17 (N.D. 111.Oct. 17, 2001).
106. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
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and Equipment,10 7 an African American employee at a San Francisco industrial
company alleged numerous incidents including finding "coon boy" written
across a cylinder in his work station, co-workers parading through his work
area with white hoods, his supervisor calling him "nigger," his supervisor
refusing his request for a shift change because he wanted him to get a
"divorce," and a denial of promotions because of racial animus.'os
In considering the employer's motion for summary judgment, Judge
Walker first confused the issue of the employer's affirmative defense with the
plaintiffs establishment of the elements of the claim. 0 9 He discounted the
"white hoods" incident because his employer did not have constructive
knowledge of the incident. He further ignored the racial dynamics of the
workplace when Shorter's supervisor denied his shift request, concluding there
was not "apparent racialanimus.,,llo Finally, in explaining why the facts of this
case did not have the necessary "gravity," he compared it to the Vance case,
where two nooses were hung in an African American woman's work station
and the court found the nooses were sufficient evidence of a hostile
environment. Distinguishing the Shorter facts from the Vance facts, he
reasoned:
[G]iven the historical significance of lynching in the United States, the
message sent by a hanging noose is much more threatening than the words
'coon boy' or 'nigger.' Thus, while the conduct alleged by Shorter is
despicable and morally reprehensible it is not sufficiently severe or pervasive
to warrant a finding of civil liability. 112
The Shorter court's message was simple: if there are no nooses (or presumably
something similarly repugnant), there is no racial harassment claim.
In summary, these cases illustrate how judges adhering to a traditional
jurisprudential model hold plaintiffs to standards for proving racial harassment
that are based on an old-fashioned model of racism. They assume that legally
cognizable racial harassment must be based on explicit and egregious racism,
and are often accompanied by racism-plus requirements on how that explicit
racism occurs.
II. ALTERNATIVE JURISPRUDENTIAL MODEL AND MODERN RACISM
The alternative jurisprudential model moves away from traditionally
defined racism to acknowledge the spectrum of conscious and subconscious,
overt and covert, obvious and subtle actions that constitute racial harassment.
107. Shorter v. Altair Gases & Equip., Inc., No. C-95-3010-VRW (ENE), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14776 (N.D. Ca. Sept. 19, 1997).
108. Id. at *4-5.
109. Id. at *9-10.

110. Id. at *7-8.
111. Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir, 1989).
112. Shorter, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14776, at * 17.
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This model recognizes blatant examples of harassment, but its scope also
includes careful consideration of cases that are far more complex and nuanced.
Indeed, an already-sizeable body of social science research has substantiated
the term "modem racism" to reflect the often-times subtle racism that happens
in contemporary America. When applied to the legal context, research on
modem racism implicates traditional conceptions of racial harassment as
insufficient measurements of racism as it realistically occurs. The alternative
jurisprudential model responds to this by expanding the definition of racial
harassment, incorporating (if not yet embracing) the complexity, nuance, and
subtlety of modem racism.
While few courts have directly addressed whether Title VII covers modem
racism, the landmark Rogers case noted that Congress intended it to be liberally
and flexibly interpreted to achieve its anti-discrimination purposes, describing
Title VII as "broad-gauged innovation [sic] legislation .. . to be elucidated and

explicated by experience, time, and expertise."" 3 CitingRogers with approval,
the Supreme Court also has explained that "Title VII affords employees the
right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult."114
A. Social Science Researchers Illuminate Modem Racism
Incidents of blatant and explicit racial discrimination, as envisioned in the
classic racial harassment paradigm and as illustrated in the cases above,
unfortunately still occur-but much less frequently. Employment
discrimination cases prohibiting expressly racist employment decisions, as well
as evolving social norms in our language and conduct, help to explain a decline
in old-fashioned racism." 5
Despite the decrease in old-fashioned racism, however, significant and
116
widespread economic and occupational disparities between races remain. 1 At
the same time, a large number of minority employees continue to claim
discrimination, including harassment, in their jobs." 7 In a recent survey, for
113. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972). Also see the discussion
accompanying supra notes 7-8, and Part II.B. for cases discussing more subtle forms of
racism.
114. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
115. See Lilia M. Cortina, Unseen Injustice: Incivility as Modern Discrimination in
Organizations,33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 55, 58-59 (2008) (noting common beliefs of modem
racists and explanations for modem racism's development).
116. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Likisha and Jamal?A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
94 AMER. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004) (noting, for example, as compared with Whites,
African Americans are twice as likely to be unemployed and earn nearly 25% less when they
are employed). See Cortina,supra note 115, at 59.
117. E.g., Charles Babbington, Poll Shows Gap Between Blacks and Whites Over
Racial Discrimination,NUESTRA VOICE, Sept. 22, 2008, http://neustravoice.com/?p=2478
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instance, 42% of African Americans reported that they have experienced racial
discrimination in the workplace." 8 While the explanations for these ongoing
racial disparities and perceptions of discrimination are complex and not fully
understood, substantial evidence suggests that racism in the workplace has not
ended. Instead, racism has simply morphed from its more blatant and explicit
form into something that is much more subtle and covert, a form social
scientists call "modem racism."'' 9
While scholars have theorized for some time that explicit and conscious
bias is not the only form of racism,120 researchers are actively engaged in
learning more about the actual forms, causes, and consequences of these forms
of modern racism. 121 Furthermore, the relevance of modem racism to racial
harassment laws has not yet been focused upon. Thus, as background to our
subsequent analysis of the alternative jurisprudential model, social science
research on (1) ways that racism can be subtle, implicit, and inferred, and (2)
how social and organizational norms can influence the occurrence of both
(significant percentage of African Americans indicated that "a lot" of discrimination against
African Americans exists); Katherine C. Naff, To LOOK LIKE AMERICA: DISMANTLING
BARRIERS FOR WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN GOVERNMENT 147 tbl.6.3 (2001) (indicating

various racial groups' perceptions of treatment in their organization); Susan Page, Poll:
Racial Divide Narrowing but Persists,USA TODAY, July 24, 2008, at 6A fig. (indicating that
less than half of African Americans surveyed responded "yes" to: "In general, do blacks
have as good a chance as whites in your community to get any kind of job for which they are
qualified?"). See also discussion accompanying infra notes 151-156 (providing evidence of
disproportionate "selective harassment" of women and minorities).
118. Kevin Hunt, On the Job Race, Age and Gender Discrimination, WESTBLOG,
(Nov. 6, 2008), http://tnalcorpcomm.wordpress.com/2008/ 11/06/on-the-job-race-age-andgender-discrimination/.
119. See infra note 121.

120. For two classic pieces, see Peggy C. Davis, Popular Legal Culture: Law as
Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
121. See generally Dietch et al., supra note 100; John Dovidio et al., Implicit and
Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 62
(2002); John Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J.
Soc. ISSUES 829 (2001); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice,and Discriminationat the
Seam Between the Centuries:Evolution, Culture, Mind, and Brain, 30 EUR. J. SoC. PSYCHOL.

299 (2000); Suzy Fox & Lamont E. Stallworth, Racial/ethnic Bullying: Exploring Links
Between Bullying and Racism in the US Workplace, 66 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAv. 438 (2005).

For examples of the range of research on the consequences of modem racism, see Contrada
et al., supra note 100; Dietch, supra note 100, at 1302-04, 1314; Michael Inzlicht et al.,
Stigma as Ego Depletion: How Being the Target of Prejudice Affects Self-Control, 17
PSYCHOL. Sct. 262 (2006); Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, When Prejudice Does
Not Pay: Effects of InterracialContact on Executive Function, 14 PSYCHOL. SC. 287 (2003);
and Claude Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 AMER. PSYCHOL. 613 (1997). Finally, for examples of other forms of subtle
bias, see Mark Deal, Aversive Disablism: Subtle Prejudice Toward Disabled People, 22
DISABILITY & Soc'Y. 93 (2007); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind
the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination
Law, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 835 (2004); Vicent J. Roscigno et al., Age Discrimination, Social
Closure,and Employment, 86 Soc. FORCES 313 (2007).
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explicit and implicit racial harassment, is highlighted below.
1. Racism is not always explicit; it can be subtle, implicit, or inferred.
Unlike explicit racism, implicit and subtle forms of racism are, by their
nature, difficult to observe directly. Thus, researchers use alternative methods
to assess racism indirectly. Some researchers design studies to assess inferential
racism in what might otherwise appear to be race-neutral decision-making. To
illustrate, economists Marianne Bertrand and Sendhill Mullianthan sent over
5000 resumes in response to over 1300 help-wanted ads in Chicago and
Boston.122 The researchers then recorded the numbers of callbacks for
interviews that each resume received. The jobs covered a large spectrum,
including sales, clerical, and management positions. The researchers tested for
racial differences by experimentally altering the names on the resumes:
We randomly assign very White-sounding names (such as Emily Walsh or
Greg Baker) to half the resumes and very African-American-sounding names
(such as Lakisha Washington or Jamal Jones) to the other half. Because we are
also interested in how credentials affect discrimination, we experimentally
vary the quality of the resumes used in response to a given ad.

. .

. In practice,

we typically send four resumes in response to each ad: two higher-quality and
two lower-quality ones. We randomly assign to one of the higher- and one of
123
the lower-quality resumes an African-American sounding name.
Bertrand and Mullianthan found large racial differences in callback
rates.124 There was a fifty percent racial gap in callback rates, where applicants
with White names having to send out ten resumes for one callback in
comparison to applicant with African American names requiring fifteen
resumes. In addition, they found that Whites were rewarded more for better
resumes than African Americans. Whites with higher quality resumes received
thirty percent more callbacks than Whites with lower-quality resumes; there
was much less benefit for African Americans with high quality resumes. As
Bertrand and Mullianthan observe: "Discrimination therefore appears to bite
twice, making it harder not only for African Americans to find a job but also to
improve their employability."l25
Other studies in non-employment settings also illustrate that racism can be
inferred even though there are not explicit or egregious racist acts. For instance,
recent studies indicate that linguistic profiling based on race exists.126 In one
122.

Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note

116,

at 992.

123. Id.
124. Id.

125. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Likisha and Jamal?A FieldExperiment on Labor Market Discrimination 3

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873 (describing findings of study).
126. See, e.g., John Baugh, Linguistic Contributions to the Advancement of Racial
Justice Within and Beyond the African Diaspora,I LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS COMPASs 331
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study by John Baugh, prospective renters who called to inquire about apartment
vacancies in the San Francisco area were treated differently depending on
whether they used standard English, African American vernacular English, or
Chicano English.127 Those using standard English were able to arrange
significantly more appointments to view the apartments in the more affluent
and predominantly White neighborhoods, in comparison to those who spoke in
African American or Chicano English. 128 Donald Rubin's intriguing study also
suggests that visual cues may trigger subtle racism.129 University students
listened to a four minute tape recorded by a single speaker, who was a native
English speaker raised in Ohio.' 30 While they listened to the reading, they were
shown a projected photo and told it was a picture of the speaker. Some students
were shown a White woman while other students were shown an Asian woman.
The two women were similarly dressed, with similar hairstyles, and
photographed in the same setting. Rubin found that students' comprehension
was lower for the groups shown the photo of the Asian speaker and higher for
groups shown the White instructor. Participants also reported hearing more
of a foreign accent with the Asian speaker. Thus, it appeared that the speaker's
race altered the way students heard and understood the same information.
Studies in the criminal justice system also find racial differences in the
capital sentencing context.132 Researchers have consistently found that
defendants found guilty of killing a White person rather than an African
American person were more likely to be sentenced to death, and that African
American defendants were more likely to be sentenced to death than White
defendants.133 Moreover, one study found that African American defendants
convicted of murdering White victims were more likely to receive the death
penalty if they had facial features (e.g., lips, nose, hair texture, skin tone) that
were more stereotypically Black than African American defendants perceived

(2007); Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial
Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings, 36 URB. AFF. REV.
452 (2001); Donald L. Rubin, Nonlanguage Factors Affecting Undergraduates' Judgments
ofNonnative English-Speaking Teaching Assistants, 33 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 511 (1992).
127. Baugh, supra note 126, at 336-37.
128. Id. at 337. In predominantly non-White lower income neighborhoods, however,
those who spoke with African American vernacular had more appointments than either those
with standard or Chicano English, but the differences among groups was not as significant.
Id.
129. Rubin, supra note 126. See also Donald L. Rubin & Kim A. Smith, Effects of
Accent, Ethnicity, and Lecture Topic on Undergraduates' Perceptions ofNonnative EnglishSpeaking Teaching Assistants, 14 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 337 (1990); Kim Yurako,
Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination, 74 GEO . WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006).
130. Rubin, supra note 126, at 514-515.
131. Id. at 516-519.
132. See, e.g., CASSIA L. SPOHN, How Do JUDGEs DECIDE? 101-17 (2002).
133. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of
Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 383, 383 (2006).
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as less stereotypically Black.134 In contrast, the perceived stereotypicality of
African American defendants did not predict death sentencing when the victims
were African American. These researchers conjectured that in cases involving
an African American defendant and a White victim, jurors found race more
salient than in cases where the defendant and the victim were of the same race.
Furthermore, jurors then associated stereotypically African American physical
traits with criminality, thus cuing them to the "deathworthiness" of these
individuals. 1s
Another group of researchers use research technologies and instruments
A prime
designed to detect implicit, often unconscious, cognitive bias.'
example of this research is based on physiological measures of how individuals
respond to different stimuli, as exemplified by the Implicit Association Test
(IAT).1 3 7 While there are critics of this research methodology, 38 others
applaud it as an innovative merging of scientific technology and the study of
modem racism.' 39
The Implicit Association Test . .. requires participants to rapidly classify
individual stimuli into one of four distinct categories using only two
responses. As with priming, the assumption is that responses will be
facilitated-and thus faster and more accurate-when categories that are
closely associated are paired than when they are not paired.

. .

. For example, a

person with a negative implicit attitude toward blacks would be expected to go
more quickly when black and bad share one key and white and good the other
than when the pairings of good and bad are switched.140

383, 385.
385.
136. These instruments are designed to minimize individuals' inclination to present
134. Id. at
135. Id. at

themselves as they think is socially appropriate (self-presentation bias). See Kristin Lane et
al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 427 (2007) (summarizing
this type of research).
137. Id. at 428.

138. E.g., John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of
Being, 54 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999); C. Miguel Brendl et al., How Do Indirect

Measures of Evaluation Work? Evaluating the Inference of Prejudice in the Implicit
Association Test, 81 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 760 (2001); Mark Chen & John A. Bargh,
Consequences of Automatic Evaluation: Immediate Behavioral Predispositionsto Approach
or Avoid the Stimulus, 25 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 215 (1999).

139. See Lane, supra note 136, at 428-31.
140. The administration of the IAT proceeds in the following way:
Imagine sitting at a computer. Your job appears simple: As words such as happy and angry
appear sequentially on the screen, indicate whether each is good (happy is good) or bad
(angry is bad) by pressing marked keys on a keyboard. But more than the words appear on
the screen. In fact, each word to be judged as good or bad is preceded by a black or white
face (i.e., individuals with origins in Africa or Europe) that you see but do not respond to.
You merely ignore the face and respond to the words.
To the psychologists who performed this study, the data of interest were the speed to
respond (with some attention to accuracy of responses) to each word. Data were sorted into

four separate types: Trials in which good words like happy were preceded by (a) a white
face, (b) a black face; and trials in which bad words like angry were preceded by (c) a white
face, (d) a black face. From the many studies that have used this procedure, we know that
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Thus, latency response measures purportedly demonstrate that racial
attitudes and stereotyping operate subconsciously to alter response time and
decision-making. In general, the greater the associative strength between two
stimuli, the faster people can make decisions about them. Numerous studies
using this methodology find that Whites are subliminally more likely to
associate negative attributes (e.g. bad, lazy, unintelligent, criminal) to African
Americans than to Whites and less likely to associate positive attributes (e.g.
good, hardworking, intelligent, law-abiding) to African Americans than to
Whites.141 It is further believed that this implicit bias is reinforced through a
myriad of societal forces and becomes mindless; that is, operative without any
conscious intention. 142
2. Social and organizational norms affect the occurrence of racial
harassment.
Researchers also find that the social climate, including organizational
norms, interact with implicit biases. Work by Jonathan Ziegart, Paul Hanges,143
and Lilia Cortina'" illustrate this kind of research. Ziegart and Hanges' study,
for instance, suggested that individuals appear more likely to act on their
implicit biases when an authority figure or role model, such as one's supervisor
or organizational leader, condones discrimination.145 Participants in their study
were administered a battery of instruments, including one that assessed their
implicit (rather than express) racist attitudes.146 Participants were then asked to
play the role of a manager and to evaluate job applicants for a vice president
position on the basis of a packet of information about each candidate. Some
participants had an additional memo from the company president providing a
business justification for preferring a White vice president. The researchers
found that participants who were provided the business justification for
discrimination and had implicit racist attitudes were more likely than others to
discriminate (to select the White candidate).147
speed to judge that happy is good is noticeably faster when that word is preceded by the mere
flash of a white (rather than a black) face. Likewise, it is mentally easier to respond that
angry is bad when it is preceded by the brief presence of a black rather than white face. This
differential ease of pairing white+good and black+bad is taken as an indirect measure of the
strength of automatic relative preference for the two social groups.

Lane, supra note 136, at 428.
141. See Lane, supra note 136, at 431-37, 434 tbl. I (summarizing research); Dovidio,
supra note 121, at 839.
142. Dovidio, supra note 121, at 838.
143. Jonathan C. Ziegart & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of

Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553
(2005).

144.
145.
146.
147.

See Cortina, supra note 115.
Ziegart & Hanges, supra note 143, at 560-61.
Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 560-61.
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Cortina considers further this interaction between individuals' personal
convictions and employers' organizational stances on discrimination.148 She
proposes that this relationship helps predict whether racial harassment will
occur, and if so, whether that harassment will be overt or more subtle. As
depicted in the Table below, Cortina posits four different alternative
scenarios. 149 Quadrant I depicts the optimal situation, where the organization
prohibits discrimination (as indicated by a nondiscrimination policy which is
meaningfully enforced, supervisors who do not permit racial discrimination
including harassment, and racially egalitarian norms), and at the same time,
individual workers are not biased. The expected result would be no
discrimination in the workplace. Quadrant 4 depicts the least desirable scenario,
where individuals are biased and the organization permits or promotes
discrimination (as indicated by lax enforcement of or absence of a
nondiscrimination policy, supervisors who permit racial discrimination, and
racist norms). The most likely result in a Quadrant 4 employment environment
would be overt discrimination in the workplace. Biased individuals can be open
about their racial harassment because the organization does not restrain or
inhibit those prejudices.
Table 1.

Individual

N

Not Discriminatory

Discriminatory

Not discriminatory

1

3

Discriminatory

2

4

In contrast to the situations depicted in Quadrants 1 and 4, where the
individual workers' and the organization's approaches to bias are in sync,
Quadrants 2 and 3 depict situations where the individuals' and the
organization's approaches are in conflict. Cortina argues that these situations
are particularly ripe for more subtle and implicit discrimination. In Quadrant 2,
individuals who are not biased work in an organization that permits or
promotes bias. While these workers are ideologically opposed to racism and
148. Cortina, supra note 115, at 63-64. Table 1, infra., was modified from Cortina, id,
at 63 fig.2.
149. Id. at 63.
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therefore are unlikely to engage in overt racism, they naturally want to fit in
and be accepted by their supervisors and coworkers. Therefore, they might
engage in more subtle and rationalized harassment, perhaps even
unconsciously, as a way to reconcile their need to be part of the group while not
compromising their nonbiased self-images.150 (Of course, these individuals
may also be the ones who report racism or try to stop it, although they risk
organizational retaliation for doing so.) Finally, the situation in Quadrant 3 is
where racist individuals work in an organizational environment which prohibits
discrimination. Knowing that they would be criticized and sanctioned for overt
discriminatory actions, such as blatant racial harassment, they instead would be
inclined to express their personal biases covertly, finding more subtle ways to
harass minority coworkers. Therefore, employers in Quadrant 3 would need to
be particularly vigilant in detecting and stopping subtle racial harassment.
Cortina further proposes that supervisors' or coworkers' incivility toward
minorities and women, while not ostensibly targeting those groups, may
nonetheless be a veiled manifestation of selective harassment of those groups.
She posits that one can mask discrimination, perhaps even unconsciously, in
everyday acts. Thus, minorities may be less likely to be included or welcome in
work projects and networking events, or their work performance may be
evaluated differently and more critically. Since these acts are not ostensibly
racist or sexist, one can maintain a self-image of being unbiased. This selective
incivility is most likely to occur, she suggests, in circumstances that foster
covert bias, such as those described in Quadrants 2 and 3.
As evidence of her theory of selective racial and gender harassment,
Cortina and her colleagues cite a survey of 4,608 attorneys practicing in the
federal courts.15 1 They found that more women (65%) than men (47%)
described recent experiences of "general incivility" in the context of their
work.152 Similarly, Cortina found this same gender difference in a survey of
court employees. 13 In yet another study by Cortina of government employees
and workers in a law enforcement agency, women and minorities, as compared
to men and white employees, reported a higher percentage of "incivilities"
toward them.154 In particular, women and minorities more often described
being treated by others in the following ways: "ignored you or failed to speak
to you," "doubted your judgment on a matter over which you had

150. Because subtle racism is so subtle, i.e., often times not noticeable, then these
individuals have to figure out a way for their actions to be recognized by those who they are
trying to impress.
151. Cortina, supra note 115, at 66.
152. Id.
153. Cortina, supra note 115, at 67 (describing earlier research). See also Kaj
Bjorkqvist et al., Aggression Among University Employees, 20 AGGRESSIVE BEHAv. 173
(1994) (finding significantly more female university employees than male employees
experienced "work harassment").
154. Cortina, supra note 115, at 67.
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responsibility," "withheld information that you needed to do your job
correctly," or "failed to give you an award or recognition you deserved."'
While there may be various explanations for these racial and gender differences
in incivilities,' 5 6 Cortina proposes a possible answer: Although these incivilities
do not include clearly identifiable markers such as racial or sexual slurs,
minority and women workers are being harassed more often because of their
race and gender. Organizational and social pressures or their own self-image of
egalitarianism, for instance, may prompt harassers to be discreet about their
racial harassment, and thus, not use more explicit racist or sexist language.
In summary, social scientists are continuing to learn more about modem
racism. Studies, such as those by Bertrand and Mullianthan, indicate that
employers discriminate in their decision-making based on the candidates' race,
even though they may not be aware of it and their decision-making may appear
neutral on its face. Other researchers, such as Massey, Rubin, and Eberhardt,
emphasize how the speech or appearance of individuals of a particular race may
result in negative outcomes for minorities, even though the decision-makers
may not have expressly indicated their bias. Social scientists explain, for
instance, that categorizing people into racial groups often triggers both explicit
and implicit stereotypes.157 IAT studies further suggest the prevalence of
individuals' implicit negative bias against racial minorities. Studies by
researchers such as Ziegart and Cortina are beginning to reveal how
organizational norms, particularly the signals of authority figures, can prompt
individuals' subtle racial harassment in instances when explicit racism may be
less likely. Although these, and other studies like them, are each highly
nuanced, collectively they build the case for and begin to flesh out our
understanding of modem racism.
B. Judges Recognize Modem Racial Harassment
In contrast to traditional racial harassment jurisprudence, some courts are
taking an alternative approach to determining whether racial harassment has
occurred. These jurists are interpreting the Supreme Court's general
guidelines 58 in ways that appear more consistent with the way empirical
studies indicate racial harassment actually occurs in contemporary America.159
While their jurisprudence is not as well-recognized as the traditionalists, their
approach is actually more reminiscent of the Rogers v. EEOC case in which the
racial harassment doctrine originated.160
155. Id.
156. For instance, Whites and men may have different standards than racial minorities
and women for what constitutes "incivilities." Cortina, supra note 115, at 67.
157. See Cortina,supra note 115, at 60.
158. See infra Part I.A.
159. See infra Part II.A.
160. After frustrating and unsuccessful efforts to get the optometrists to voluntarily
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As this Section explains, these alternative judges have a different
attitudinal mindset than the traditional jurists. They appear open to the
possibility that racial harassment may be more complicated and varied than the
classic racial harassment paradigm envisioned by the traditionalists. Without
necessarily citing the kinds of social science research highlighted above,1 61
they are analyzing racial harassment cases more in sync with the research on
modern racism. In particular, this jurisprudential approach moves beyond the
old-fashioned racism paradigm and recognizes both explicit and more subtle
racism. Furthermore, when analyzing explicit racism, such as racial slurs, it
does not tend to impose additional requirements (i.e., the racism-plus
standards), but rather considers the broader organizational and interpersonal
context in which racial incidents occur.
Some jurists even directly acknowledge that judges, like other individuals,
produce office records, the EEOC, acting on behalf of Mrs. Chavez, issued a Demand for
Access to Evidence. Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 423-24 and 424 n.l (E.D. Tex.
1970), rev'd, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). In particular,
the EEOC wanted documents showing that the optometrists used color-coded customer
intake forms-red ink for African American customers and blue or black ink for non-African
American customers. These records would support Mrs. Chavez's charge that the business
segregated patients by race.
Given that Mrs. Chavez was bringing an employment discrimination claim on her own
behalf, the Rogers brothers argued that the demand for this information about patient
treatment was overbroad. The EEOC countered with the then novel theory that the
segregation of patients, "though not directed against Mrs. Chavez, could 'create an
atmosphere that would adversely affect the terms and conditions of her employment' and
thus have an effect that is proscribed by Title VII." 316 F. Supp. at 424. Thus, the legal issue
before the district and appellate courts was whether information about a business's
discriminatory treatment of its customers was a reasonably relevant request in investigating
an employee's own charge of racial discrimination. (The district court expressly declined to
determine the merits of the underlying controversy.) Id at 424.
Rogers' holding that racial harassment was cognizable under Title VII is highly
significant in itself, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's citing to it as the first case to do so.
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986). Judge Goldberg's innovative
vision of the harassment doctrine also is noteworthy. By recognizing this particular claim as
legally viable, he was implicitly recognizing that a hostile work environment can be created
in a myriad of even subtle ways. Judge Goldberg rejected a rigid and mechanical assessment
of racial harassment. Instead, he analyzed the context of the workplace dynamics, being
cognizant of the employee's experience and compassionate feelings, putting himself in her
shoes and trying to understand how she would perceive the situation given her own minority
status.
In the most straightforward case, a minority employee would claim that she or he was
the target of the employer's racial harassment. In the Rogers case, however, the plaintiff's
claim was not that straightforward. Nonetheless, Judge Goldberg wrote that an employer's
racist action toward its customers could create more generally a racially hostile environment
for minority employees in the work setting. Minority employees could feel that the
environment was hostile even though the racism was not directed at them or even other
employees. Finally, Mrs. Chavez' acute discomfort over her employer's discriminatory
practice also illustrated her empathy across minority groups, given that Mrs. Chavez was
Hispanic and the targeted customers were African American.
161. See infra Part l.A.
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are subject to modem racial bias. Federal district court judge Mark Bennett
explains: 162
[We] have a plethora of fears, feelings, perceptions, and stereotypes that lie
deep within our subconscious. They reside there without our permission. Even
though we may, and often do, abhor these buried biases, we act on them in
both little ways . .. and in larger ways, like decisions about who we employ or
don't, who we leave on juries or don't, and who we believe or don't.
Two cases, Aman v. Cort Furniture Rentall 63 and Rodgers v. WesternSouthern Life Insurance,'6 particularly exemplify this alternative
jurisprudential model. In Aman, African American employees Carol Aman and
Jeanette Johnson worked at a furniture company's Philadelphia's district office
as a bookkeeper and as a credit manager, respectively. They claimed a racially
hostile work environment based on a number of incidents:
Aman and Johnson were referred to as "another one," "one of them," "that one
in there," and "all of you." Other black employees were harassed on a daily
basis by employees at Cort Furniture, who hurled insults such as "don't touch
anything," and "don't steal." Aman and Johnson were also subjected to
apparently false accusations of favoritism, incompetence, and were made to do
menial jobs. The evidence of record shows that white employees were not
treated in a similar fashion. In addition, several employees refused to deal with
Aman even in matters where she was directly responsible for approving a
customer's credit, and these employees were never reprimanded even though
their actions were in direct violation of company policy.
[Also,] in a discussion with Johnson, Jim Newton, the district controller,
stated that if things were not resolved with Aman, "we're going to have to
come up there and get rid of all of you." When asked whom he meant by "all
of you," Newton refused to answer.... [Then], Robert Kurtz, the general
manager, after slamming his hand on Aman's desk, told her that he knew all
about her and two other employees. The only factor the three shared in
.165
common was their race.
The employer did not offer evidence to rebut these assertions other than
characterizing them as "rude" but "race-neutral."' 66 The district court similarly
found that the evidence demonstrated only "racially-neutral acts of rudeness"
rather than racial discrimination, thus granting Cort Furniture's motion for
summary judgment.
Judge Lewis, writing on behalf of the Third Circuit appellate panel,
162. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the GordianKnot ofImplicit Bias in Jury Selection:
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARv. L. & PoL'Y REv. 149 (2010).
163.

Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074 (3rd Cir. 1996).

164. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Wis. 1992),
aff'd, 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
165. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1077-80, 1082.
166. Id. at 1082 n.5.

167. Id. at 1080 n.2, 1082-83.
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considered the incidents in a very different societal context-one which reflects
his recognition of "modern racism:"
Though they still happen, the instances in which employers and employees
openly use derogatory epithets to refer to fellow employees appear to be
declining. Regrettably, however, this in no way suggests that discrimination
based upon an individual's race, gender, or age is near an end. Discrimination
continues to pollute the social and economic mainstream of American life, and
is often simply masked in more subtle forms. It has become easier to coat
various forms of discrimination with the appearance of propriety, or to ascribe
some other less odious intention to what is in reality discriminatory behavior.
In other words, while discriminatory conduct persists, violators have learned
not to leave the proverbial "smoking gun" behind. As one court has
recognized, "[d]efendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit
discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it." But regardless
of the form that discrimination takes, the impermissible impact remains the
same, and the law's prohibition remains unchanged. "Title VII tolerates no
168
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise."
He then described how a reasonable jury, given the "totality of the
circumstances," might alternatively interpret the incidents described above:
[Tihe use of "code words" can, under circumstances such as we encounter
here, violate Title VII. Indeed, a reasonable jury could conclude that the intent
to discriminate is implicit in these comments.

. .

. There are no talismanic

expressions which must be invoked as a condition-precedent to the application
of laws designed to protect against discrimination.

..

. [S]tatements like the

ones allegedly made in this case send a clear message and carry the distinct
tone of racial motivations and implications. They could be seen as conveying
the message that members of a particular race are disfavored and that
members of that race are, therefore, not full and equal members of the
workplace.. . . [T]he pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms directed
at members of a protected class generally, and addressed to those employees
169
personally, may serve as evidence of a hostile environment.
Moreover, Judge Lewis explains, other events, when viewed in isolation,
arguably may not have been racially motivated. But given the "suspicious
remarks" above, they could also be interpreted to be part of a "complex tapestry
of discrimination when examined in conjunction with the comments made by
Cort Furniture's employees and management."170 As the court analogized:
A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its
entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate
not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario......... What may
appear to be a legitimate justification for a single incident of alleged
harassment may look pretextual when viewed in the context of several other
incidents." . . . Indeed, we have previously held that overt racial harassment is

168. Id. at 1082-83 (citing Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987)).
169. Id. at 1083.
170. Id.
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not necessary to establish a hostile environment.171
Given this contextual analysis, the appellate court reversed the district court's
granting of the employer's motion for summary judgment. 172
In Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance,173 both the district court
and the appellate court also illustrate this alternative jurisprudential model in a
number of particularly instructional and detailed ways, including recognizing
that racial harassment can be implicit as well as explicit and that social and
organizational norms can affect the occurrence of racial harassment. At the
same time, the Rodgers courts illustrate that judges are learning how modem
racism can be complicated and can present daunting interpretational challenges.
James Rodgers, an African American associate sales manager and former
agent for an insurance company, argued in a bench trial that he had been
racially harassed. 174 He worked as a top-selling sales agent for seven years
under three different White associate sales managers with no significant
conflicts. After being promoted to associate sales manager himself, his
immediate supervisor, William Mann, became district manager. Rodgers
accused Mann of racial harassment, claiming explicit and implicit examples of
racism. The courts had to determine if the racial harassment had occurred under
both a reasonable person's objective standard and the plaintiffs subjective
standard. Unlike the typical racial harassment judicial decision where the court
is ruling on the employer's motion for summary judgment,175 the opinions here
were the result of a bench trial in the district court, followed by an appeal to the
appellate court. Both courts held for the plaintiff. 176
Judge Reynolds, writing for the district court, and Judge Flaum, writing for
the appellate court, both signaled they would not take a rigid and mechanical
approach to assessing racial harassment. 177 Furthermore, they noted that the
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1084.
173. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Wis. 1992),
aff'd, 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
174. Id. at 630-34.
175. Chew & Kelley, supra note 2, at 78 tbl.10 (finding that 79.1% of the district court
judicial opinions and 73.6% of the appellate judicial opinions in their study of racial
harassment cases are motions for summary judgment).
176. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1993).
177. Rodgers, 792 F. Supp. at 633-34; Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 674-75. Judge Reynolds
admonished that courts should not place undue weight on the simple number of events; the
plaintiff does not prove harassment by alleging some "magic" number of incidents.
Conversely, an employer does not rebut the claim simply by noting that the incidents are too
few. Rodgers, 792 F. Supp. at 633-634 (quoting Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d
1264, 1273-1274 (7th Cir. 1991)). Judge Flaum, writing for the appellate court, agreed with
the district court, noting that a mechanical application might overlook or underemphasize the
most important features of the harassment inquiry. 12 F.3d at 674 (citing Daniels, 937 F.2d
1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991)), the appellate court indicated that determining the objective
reasonableness of a harassment claim may entail:
[T]he nature of the alleged harassment, the background and experience of the plaintiff, her
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cumulative weight of seemingly isolated incidents may also be appropriate in
examining the totality of the circumstances. 178 With this more flexible
approach in mind, these courts proceeded to analyze the facts to determine if
Rodgers had shown that both a reasonable person (objective standard) and he
(subjective standard) found Mann's harassment was because of his race and so
severe or pervasive that it resulted in a racially hostile work environment.
First, the courts analyzed overtly racist incidents in the realistic
organizational context in which they occurred. Mann on numerous occasions
used the term "nigger," and made an explicitly racist comment about Rodgers'
sales agents, all of whom were African American. 179 Referring to the agents,
Mann stated boldly "You black guys are too f***ing dumb to be insurance
agents." The company defended Mann's use of racial slurs, arguing that
Mann's use of the word "nigger" should not be considered racist since African
American employees, including Rodgers, also used the word. The company
also argued that the remark about the African Americans' lack of intelligence
was an isolated remark used as a motivational technique.
Appellate Judge Flaum responded to the employer's argument in a way
that considered the effect of organizational norms in fostering or discouraging
racial harassment, particularly as modeled by someone in authority.'so He
observed that given Mann's supervisory role, his use of the word harms the
work environment "far more severely than use by co-equals." "Perhaps no
single act can more quickly 'alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment,' than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet
such as 'nigger' by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.", ' The
coworkers and supervisors, the totality of the physical environment of the plaintiffs work
area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before
and after the plaintiffs introduction into its environs, coupled with the reasonable
expectations of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment.
12 F.3d at 674.
178. Rodgers, 792 F. Supp. at 630-34, affd, 12 F.3d at 675.

179. Rodgers, 12 F.3d 668.
180. Others have acknowledged the importance of social and organizational context.
For example, Judge Ripple, in a concurring opinion in Mason v. Southern Illinois Univ., 233
F.3d 1036, 1048-1049 (7th Cir. 2000) stated:
A supervisor ought not escape the strictures of Title VII when she sets the stage for the
harassment of a worker and then simply absents herself when the actual harassment takes
place.... [T]he supervisor was sending a signal that treating the plaintiff in a racially
discriminatory matter was acceptable conduct in which the workers could indulge safely
without fear of reprisal - a message confirmed when a coworker did make such a statement
before the supervisor and incurred no sanction.
[These statements can be relevant for] showing the intent of the supervisor in making the
statements and to demonstrate that the statements that were heard by the employee were the
products of an intense and concerted effort to set the employee apart from his fellow workers
on the basis of his race.
The actions and statements of the coworkers also can be relevant . . . on the issue of
whether the harassment was pervasive. Here again, the employee was entitled to show that
the supervisor's statements to the coworkers signaled that the supervisor condoned, or even
encouraged, the racial harassment of the employee.
181. Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 675.
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appellate court also found unpersuasive the company's defense of Mann's
statements about African American agents' intelligence as a management tool.
Explained the court: "Title VII does not permit supervisors to use this type of
blanket criticism of the intelligence of a racially-defined class of employees as
a motivational technique." 82
In addition, while some racist comments were specifically directed at
Rodgers and in Rodgers' presence, others were not. Some traditional jurists,
taking a more rigid approach, would have concluded that these later comments
did not support plaintiffs' complaints of a racially hostile work environment
because they could not have "experienced" comments for which they were not
physically present and of which they were not the designated targets. In this
alternative jurisprudential model, jurists do not impose this racism-plus
standard.184 Both the district court and the appellate court in Rodgers instead
recognized that individuals need not be present nor be the target of comments
or actions to be negatively affected by them or for them to contribute to a
hostile environment for the plaintiff. For instance, the district court concluded
that Mann's use of the word "nigger" "deeply offended" Rodgers even though
the epithet was not always directed at Rodgers personally.'
Similarly,
Rodgers could understandably take Mann's comments about the intelligence of
Rodgers' African American sales agents "to imply that [Rodgers himself] was
not qualified to be an insurance agent because of his race."l86 As the appellate
182. Id.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 69-88.

184. In reversing the district court in Schwapp v. Town ofA von, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17768 (D. Conn. 1996) (see supra discussion accompanying notes 75-89), the appellate
court, Schwapp v. Town ofAvon, 118 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1997), took a view consistent with
the second jurisprudential wave. It found that the incidents describing specific racist
incidents in the affidavits were both particular and relevant. Id. at 111-112. Considering both
the situational and historic context in which these events occurred, it acknowledged that
cumulative incidents, including those not expressly involving the minority plaintiff, can
create a racially hostile environment:
Schwapp's awareness that a supervisor in the [department] told officers to target minorities
for traffic stops could very well be relevant to Schwapp's reasonable perception of a hostile
work environment....
.... The mere fact that Schwapp was not present when a racially derogatory comment
was made will not render that comment irrelevant . . . . Just as a racial epithet need not be
directed at a plaintiff in order to contribute to a hostile work environment, the fact that a
plaintiff learns second-hand of a racially derogatory comment or joke by a fellow employee
or supervisor also can impact the environment ....
Likewise, the incidents relating to other minorities and those occurring before Schwapp's
tenure may be of limited probative value, but cannot be ignored on summary judgment.
Whether Schwapp was aware of them during his employment, and, more significantly,

whether in light of these incidents, the incidents Schwapp experienced more directly 'would
reasonably be perceived ... as hostile or abusive,' are factual issues that should be resolved
by a trier of fact.

Schwapp, 118 F.3d at 111-12 (internal citations omitted).
185. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 634 (E.D. Wis.

1992).
186. Id.
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court concluded: "[t]he facts here reveal that Mann's unlawful racial abuse
gradually eroded Rodgers' self-esteem and adversely affected his job
performance."1 87
Second, the Rodgers courts recognized several ways in which ostensibly
race-neutral incidents might nonetheless be relevant to a determination of racial
harassment, particularly in satisfying the plaintiff's subjective standard.
Rodgers argued that a number of Mann's actions, while race-neutral on their
face, were part of a regime of racial harassment. 88 For instance, Mann was a
combative and unpleasant person, who regularly insulted the sales managers
with profanity and negative comments, presumably as a motivational
technique. Mann also called Rodgers by the nickname "rabbit," stepping out of
his office and yelling, for instance, "Rabbit, get in here." At one point, Mann
also increased the number of accounts that Rodgers was to service, requiring
Rodgers to work more nights per week. When Rodgers requested a reduction in
his workload and a return to his non-managerial sales position because of
health problems, Mann refused and threatened to fire him.189
While traditional judges assume that ostensibly race-neutral incidents
cannot be relevant to an inquiry of racial harassment, the district court here did
not automatically reach this conclusion. It instead considered each incident and
analyzed why the plaintiff believed these incidents were relevant and why the
company thought they were not. Consequently, the district court found that
some of Mann's actions, namely his decisions to increase Mann's workload and
his rejection of Rodgers' requests for a return to his old job, were not racially
motivated, but instead that Mann had business reasons unrelated to Rodgers'
race for his decisions.' 90 On the other hand, the court did consider these
incidents relevant in assessing Rodgers' subjective perception of his work
environment. In particular, as we subsequently discuss,'91 the court opened the
door to the possibility that an employee in Rodgers' position might credibly
view even race-neutral actions as forms of implicit racism.
The district court also recognized that conduct which is not explicitly racist
may be implicitly racist if considered in their social and historical contexts.
Mann once admonished Rodgers with the statement, "You must think that
you're back in Arkansas chasing jackrabbits."' 92 While not using explicit racist
language, the district court nonetheless recognized that Rodgers "not
unreasonably construed" this comment as "a racial slur intended to malign his
black, southern heritage and to suggest that he should not have become an
insurance agent."l193 By interpreting Mann's comments this way, the court
187. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 677 (7th Cir. 1993).

188. Rodgers, 792 F. Supp. at 631.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 632.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 195-97.
192. Rodgers, 792 F. Supp. at 631.
193. Id. While the appellate court found that the employer's "characterization of the
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acknowledged that a racist message need not include explicitly racist slurs or
other specific racial or ethnic references. Instead a message may use references
to geography, social roles, or personal characteristics that are stereotypically
associated with those groups. 194 In this way, the speaker can replace a socially
or politically unacceptable expression with one that is more veiled but still
implicitly derogatory.
Finally, the district court indicated that incidents that appear race-neutral
might in combination with all other incidents and workplace dynamics, be
racist by inference. Rodgers argued that after incidents involving Mann's
explicit racism, he began to read racist undertones into facially neutral epithets
and to impute racial motives to Mann's management decisions. 195 The district
court found this inferential racism relevant to Rodgers subjective belief of a
hostile environment:
Even though much of Mann's verbal abuse was race-neutral, Mann's racist
comments to Rodgers were so degrading that they made Rodgers feel as
though Mann questioned Rodgers' professional competence because of his
race.... [These comments] reduced his self-esteem and ability to work,
making Mann's racist references, epithets, and comments even more lethal to
Rodgers' ability to perform his job.
. . . .These statements undoubtedly encouraged Rodgers to view even
Mann's race-neutral decisions, such as his decision to transfer business to
Rodgers' open account, as racially-motivated efforts to force Rodgers out of
196
the company.
The district court reasoned that incidents that appear race-neutral,
considered in combination with all other incidents and workplace dynamics,
might be considered racist by inference. Thus, it was reasonable for Rodgers,
once given explicit evidence of his supervisor's racial animus, to consider
incidents that may not appear racist on their face to be offensive, hurtful, and
potentially racially motivated, thereby further contributing to a hostile

environment.197
While the appellate court in Rodgers affirmed the district court's holdings
that Rodgers met both the objective reasonable person standard and his
subjective standard,19 8 it was more circumspect. While exemplifying an
alternative jurisprudential approach in the various ways described above, it
nonetheless commented "in passing," that the harasser's use of expressly racist

'jack rabbit' comment as 'race-neutral' as plausible as the [district] court's finding that the
comment was a racial slur," it could not find the district court's view "clearly erroneous."
Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 676.
194. Id. at 671. See also Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The Linguistics of Color Blind Racism:
How to Talk Nasty about Blacks without Sounding "Racist", 28 CRITICAL Soc. 41 (2002)
(describing rhetorical devices for racial harassment without using explicit racist language).
195. Rodgers, 792 F. Supp. at 634.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 676-77.
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comments ("old fashioned racism") was critical to Rodgers' case.1 99 Hence,
while it would find race-neutral incidents as meaningful and relevant to a fuller
understanding of the plaintiffs claims of racial harassment, it was not ready to
conclude that only ostensibly race-neutral incidents would suffice.
Thus, the Aman, Rodgers, and other cases illustrate an alternative
jurisprudential approach. They contrast dramatically from traditional
jurisprudence by acknowledging modern racism and incorporating it into their
analysis of the plaintiff's racial harassment claim. By doing so, they open the
door to an array of factors that plaintiffs and social science researchers argue
are integral to understanding how racial harassment occurs in today's
contemporary workplace.
CONCLUSION

Racial harassment continues. Many African American, Asian American,
and Hispanic workers believe they are discriminated against, unfairly treated,
and harassed because of their race. 200 This discriminatory harassment results in
significant harms to both minority employees and their organizations.201
Moreover, minority Americans doubt that their own employers will adequately
address racial harassment in their workplaces; many do not particularly trust
their companies' internal grievance mechanisms. Thus, legal remedies become
even more important.
Federal courts still struggle with how to eliminate racially hostile work
environments. Given considerable discretion by the Supreme Court in how to
interpret racial harassment law,202 courts have taken myriad approaches. This
Article explores two models of racial harassment jurisprudence. In the
traditional model, judges tend to equate the legal definition of racial harassment
with what social scientists describe as "old-fashioned racism." 203 This is racial
harassment which is explicit on its face, typically including racial slurs or
blatantly racist conduct. These judges further envision legally cognizable racial
199. Id.

200. See supra notes 117-18; Chew & Kelley 2009, supra note 13, at 1143 tbl.3
(indicating African American, Hispanic, Asian American, and White plaintiffs in racial
harassment cases).
201. The organizational costs of racism in the workplace are not always apparent. For
instance, researchers have found that highly prejudiced individuals find it taxing to selfregulate their racist impulses, negatively affecting their performance on job-related
functions. See, e.g., Richeson & Shelton, supra note 120. Other researchers have noted a
different kind of cost: increasing diversity of all kinds increases an organization's
productivity; thus the loss of diversity prompted by racist work environments results in the
loss this productivity. See, e.g., Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem
Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.

Sci. 16385 (Nov. 16, 2004). See also supra note 121 (noting research on harms of racism on
minorities).
202. See supra Part I.A.
203. See supra Part I.B.
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harassment as harassment which is incessant, egregious, and directed
specifically at the complaining employee. When plaintiffs' complaints of racial
harassment do not match this paradigm, these traditional judges are likely to
grant the employers' motions for summary judgment, thus ending the plaintiffs'
lawsuits.
The problem with this traditional jurisprudence is that it may miss much of
the racial harassment that occurs in contemporary America, hence not
eliminating the resulting racially hostile work environments that the Civil
Rights Act was designed to address. Social science research confirms that
racism can be in different forms: one is the old-fashioned racism described
204
above; the other is racism that is more subtle, implicit, and inferred. This
second type of racism, what social scientists call "modem racism,"205 can be
unconscious and more pervasive today than old-fashion racism. Emerging
social science research also indicates that organizational context and social
norms can either nurture or discourage it.
Not all courts are ignoring modem racism. An alternative model of racial
harassment jurisprudence is also detectable.206 Early signs of this alternative
model were visible in the landmark Rogers v. EEOC case resolving Mrs.
Chavez's plight, 207 and there are also sightings in more contemporary cases.
These alternative jurists, while not necessarily citing the social science research
on modem racism, have nonetheless incorporated many of the research findings
in their analysis of plaintiffs' claims of racial harassment. They analyze the
facts in ways that acknowledge both old-fashioned and modem racism,
recognizing that that racial harassment can be subtle, implicit, and inferred.
Many also consider that social and organizational norms can affect the
occurrence and form of racial harassment. Furthermore, language and conduct
which on its face appears race-neutral can nonetheless be racist, at least to the
targeted minority employee, when considered in the social and historical
context of racism in our country. Harassers can be deliberately or
unconsciously covert in their harassment. Subtle insults can be small, but
cumulatively result in a racially hostile environment.
This alternative model of racial harassment jurisprudence, however, does
present its own challenges. In some ways, it moves the judiciary into uncharted
territory. For instance, it is not clear how evidence of modern racism should be
used. While the Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurancecourts found race-

neutral incidents as meaningful and relevant to a fuller understanding of the
plaintiffs claims of racial harassment, it was not ready to conclude that only
ostensibly race-neutral incidents (in the absence of explicit racism) would be

204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 158.
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sufficient to prove racial harassment.208 Aman v. Cort Furniture,on the other
hand, seemed ready to accept the plaintiffs cumulative claims of subtly racist
incidents as sufficient proof. 209
Moreover, while judges can easily identify explicit racial harassment,
modem racism is by its nature less obvious. Thus, judicial recognition of subtle
racism may increase the number of exaggerated or even fake claims, since it
would be difficult to disprove subtle racism. It may also prompt some plaintiffs
to look for nuanced "racism" when in fact none exists. Judges would be faced
with the parties' contentious and contrary "he said" "she said" arguments on
210
the alleged harassers' conduct and intentions.
As Judge Lewis admonished the judiciary in Aman v. Cort Furniture:"The
sophisticated would-be violator has made our job a little more difficult." 2 11
Given the reality of modem racism, the judiciary should rise to Judge Lewis'
challenge. Our increasingly diverse workforce offers the opportunity to utilize
the talents of people of all races and ethnicities. Our societal objective is to
create optimal work environments for this diverse workforce, and the Supreme
Court has similarly declared that Title VII should enable all workers to be free
from racial harassment that would otherwise hinder their productivity.212 Thus,
eliminating racially hostile work environments is essential-and a judicial
recognition of subtle racism is essential to eliminating racially hostile work
environments.

208. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Wis. 1992);
aff'd, 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993). See supra discussion accompanying notes 173-199.
209. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081-85 (3d Cir. 1996). See
supra discussion accompanying notes 163-172.
210. There are ways to navigate this unchartered territory. Having a more racially
diverse judiciary can help the predominantly White judiciary better detect and understand
authentic modem racism. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights
Act, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 34-37 (2008); Joy Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial
Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1206
(2006). Empirical research has found that African American judges have different decision
making patterns than White and Hispanic judges in racial harassment cases. Chew & Kelley
2009, supra note 13, at 1143 tbl.3 (noting that African American judges hold in favor of the
plaintiffs in 45.8% of the time, White judges 20.6% of the time and Hispanic judges 19% of
the time). There is evidence that African American judges on federal appellate panels share
their perceptions on race-related cases with White judges and that those shared insights
affect how these cases are resolved. See Cox & Miles, supra, at 34-37. Judges of all colors
can also become more skilled at assessing modem racism by learning more about social
science research on modern racism. As Part II.A illustrates, modern racism is becoming
more identifiable and measurable. Using social scientists as expert witnesses may be
increasingly prudent. Legal analysis will by necessity become more interdisciplinary.
211. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1082.
212. See supra Part l.A.

